The effective limits of agency: the role of effort in school achievement by Daw, Jonathan
  
The Effective Limits of Agency: the Role of Effort in School 
Achievement 
 
 
 
Jonathan Daw 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Sociology. 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2008 
Approved by 
Ted Mouw, Chair 
Guang Guo 
Kenneth A. Bollen 
 
 ii
 
 
Abstract 
Jonathan Daw 
The Effective Limits of Agency: the Role of Effort in School Achievement 
Under the direction of Ted Mouw, Guang Guo, and Kenneth A. Bollen 
 
Given the cards one is dealt in life, what can one do to improve one’s prospects?  And 
does where you come from matter for what you get out of your efforts?  With an eye on 
exploring these general questions this paper explores the effects of changes in school 
effort levels on mathematics academic achievement trajectories.  Findings support a 
substantially positive, but limited, role for effort in determining achievement growth 
through secondary school.  Lastly, some suggestive evidence points to stratification of the 
effects of effort in schooling by socioeconomic status.
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BSH: Bootstraps Hypothesis; the prediction that individual effort will play a major, 
positive role in academic achievement, with the rewards thereof sufficient to make a 
difference in students’ prospective life chances. 
 
CAH1: Cumulative Advantage Hypothesis I; the prediction that those in relatively 
advantaged structural positions will benefit more from their schooling efforts than do 
those in relatively disadvantaged positions. 
 
CAH2: Cumulative Advantage Hypothesis II; the prediction that those performing 
relatively well on baseline mathematics achievement tests will benefit more from their 
schooling efforts than do those who performed relatively poorly. 
 
ECH: Environmental Compensation Hypothesis; the prediction that those in relatively 
disadvantaged structural positions will benefit more from the effects of changes in school 
effort than those in relatively advantaged positions in terms of academic achievement 
gains. 
 
FE: Fixed Effects, a class of methods for unbiasedly estimating the effects of variable 
properties of observation without bias from the omission of fixed properties of 
observations. 
 
GPA: Grade Point Average. 
 
HW: Homework. 
 
IRT: Iterative Response Theory; a method to render comparable the scores of individuals 
who received different sets of questions when taking an academic achievement test. 
 
LPH: Latent Potential Hypothesis; the prediction that those in the middle and lower 
ranges of the upstream academic achievement distribution (i.e., scores measured in the 8th 
grade) will benefit more from increases in effort levels in terms of their gains in academic 
achievement scores. 
 
MAR: Missing at Random; an assumption that missing data is equal in expected value to 
the observed data conditional on the values of a set of observed covariates. 
 
MCAR: Missing Completely at Random; an assumption that missing data is equal in 
expected value to the observed data unconditionally. 
 
NELS 88: National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988; a large dataset of secondary 
school students in the United States. 
 
 vi
RE: Random Effects; an alternative class of methods for unbiasedly estimating the effects 
of variable properties of observation without bias from the omission of fixed properties of 
observations. 
 
SES: Socioeconomic Status. 
 
  
 
“The heights by great men reached and kept  
Were not obtained by sudden flight, 
But they, while their companions slept, 
Were toiling upward in the night” 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Ladder of St. Augustine, st. 10. 
 
 At least since the days of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of 
Capitalism (1905) in Europe, and in the writings of Horatio Alger, Jr. (e.g., Alger, Jr. 
1900) in the United States, commitments to individual effort and gumption in one’s work 
have been hailed as key virtues leading to success and respect in Western popular 
wisdom.  In Weber’s work, Protestants influenced by Calvinist doctrines of 
predetermination sought to demonstrate that they were among the elect through hard 
work and, hopefully, attendant economic prosperity.  In Alger’s stories, young men born 
into poverty achieved economic stability through diligent work and strength of character.  
And today, U.S. political conservative ideology holds economic success, at least in 
democratic nations with truly free market economies, largely to be a function of ability, 
hard work, and gumption, a view which mimimizes the salience of the role of context in 
individual success.  But do those who work harder actually get further ahead in America 
today?  If so overall, are the rewards of hard work equivalent for everyone? 
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 In tackling these question I aim to further understanding of what an individual can 
do to improve their lot given the cards they are dealt in life at birth –  concisely, the 
effective limits of agency.  Beyond this, the results of this analysis contribute 
meaningfully to related fields of political and empirical understanding.  Politically, if a 
typical person from an Algeresque background can pull themselves up by their bootstraps 
through hard work, this affects the moral calculus implicit in standard welfare state 
policies.  Academically, social science studies of labor force attainment typically treat 
education and job experience as measures of human capital implicitly equivalent between 
individuals.  Yet individual effort within these institutions may substantially shape the 
knowledge and know-how attained in those periods of time in ways consequential for 
subsequent attainment processes.  Exploding this black box approach to human capital 
acquisition, and informing political perspectives rooted in the opposition between 
structural determinacy and the ascendancy of hard workers, comprise secondary 
ambitions of this paper.  With an eye toward these more general questions, in this paper I 
investigate one likely key arena for the effects of hard work - the role of effort in 
secondary school in academic achievement.   
 Social science studies of educational attainment typically focus on contextual 
determinants of individual outcomes, relying on family, school, and community factors 
for their explanatory power, showing how these variables positively or negatively impact 
average individual outcomes.  Still other lines of research, most notoriously The Bell 
Curve (Herrnstein and Murray 1994) look within the body and brain to explain the main 
trends in achievement outcomes.  Here I make no effort to solve this debate, ceding at the 
outset that environmental and genetic factors likely both matter a great deal.  Instead, my 
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approach to this paper searches for the individual behavioral determinants of outcomes 
within these contexts, examining what one can do to affect the quality of one’s path 
through life after whatever relevant constellation of ability, structure, and experience has 
been established prior to early adolescence. 
 A number of studies in the last twenty-five years have attempted to estimate the 
academic achievement returns to individual studying in school, and their results provide 
context to the present analysis.  Schuman et al. (1985) initiated the current round of 
school effort-academic achievement research reports.  Surveying undergraduate students 
at the University of Michigan in the 1970s and employing several measures of effort 
during a semester, the authors report positive but insubstantial same-semester GPA 
returns to study time after controlling for earlier standardized test scores.  Instead, they 
find, upstream achievement and class attendance are much more important for college 
grades.  Hill (1991) replicates this study’s methodology and findings at an unnamed, 
smaller, and nonselective university. 
 Michaels and Miethe (1989), responding to these counterintuitive findings, argue 
that Schuman et al’s paltry estimates result from misspecification bias.  Incorporating 
additional data on “the social and employment value of good grades, pressures to 
maintain good grades, and quality of study” (309), they estimate similar cross-sectional 
OLS regressions and find more substantial GPA returns to study hours in college at a 
“large Mid-Atlantic University” (presumably Virginia Tech, where both authors were 
employed at the time).  The authors then estimate interactive models of the returns to 
school study, finding significantly higher returns for students who study but don’t 
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“cram,” those with regular study routines, and for juniors and seniors compared to their 
complements. 
 In 2000 Rau and Durand published a similar, but more theoretically involved, 
study examining the roles of an index of academic study habits1, drinking behaviors, and 
a subjective measure of the “academic ethic” at Illinois State University.  While their 
analysis combined a number of elements, a key portion served as a replication of 
Schuman et al’s findings using the academic study index combined with a measure of 
drinking levels2 as joint indicators of “present effort,” which exerted strong, positive 
effects on same-semester GPA. 
 Perhaps as a matter of convenience and cost, all of these above research efforts 
have been conducted in college settings at a single campus using relatively small 
samples.  This practice has limited the generalizability of their findings, both by 
geographic location and subpopulation since college students are not representative in 
many key respects of the general US population.  Fortunately, the geographic concerns 
are somewhat ameliorated since these surveys have taken place at different universities, 
in different regions, and with variously selective admissions practices.  But many of the 
most crucial processes to stratification take place far earlier in the life course than college 
education. If one wishes to obtain more general notions of the importance of effort, it is 
important to examine more representative populations.  Furthermore, all of these studies 
have employed grade point average (GPA) as their modeled outcomes.  While of interest 
                                                 
1
 The index included an indicator of whether R studied during the past week and/or weekend; hours spent 
studying during a ‘normal’ week/weekend; and their typical study pattern – “cramming” or a regular 
routine. 
 
2
 This apparently baffling interpretation of low alcohol consumption as effort stems from their theoretical 
interest in the “academic ethic,” which resembles a kind of intellectual asceticism.  Because of this 
theoretical interest apart from pure studying behavior, Rau and Durand’s findings are relevant but not 
directly comparable to those of the other studies here reported. 
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in itself since GPA determines whether one may graduate from school and, to a lesser 
degree, what sorts of later opportunities individuals can access, GPA is an imperfect and 
unreliable measure of actual learning, the root interest in studies of academic 
achievement.  GPA derives from the average of a set of grades doled out by different 
professors in different subjects of different difficulties, and therefore is unlikely to be 
highly comparable between students, particularly in a collegiate setting in which 
coursework is highly centralized by subject. 
Last and most damningly, all but one of these previous studies analyze their data 
cross-sectionally, either at a single time point or in a single time range of less than a year.  
Since the studies generally employ Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis, their 
results are threatened by the conflations of unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
Methodologically, since individual effort decisions are likely to be impacted by 
individual properties besides measured pre-college academic achievement (for which all 
of these models control) through factors like work disposition, ambitions, relevance of 
coursework for career paths, and residual academic ability unmeasured by standardized 
tests, omitted variable bias severely threatens the results from all of these models.  More 
substantively, these cross-sectional designs do not permit study of change processes over 
time, which constitutes the arena most amenable to individual and programmatic 
intervention, and which may reveal subtleties beyond those available to single-shot 
analyses. 
 Two more recent, methodologically serious papers have attempted to account for 
one or more of these criticisms.  Using data from the National Educational Longitudinal 
Study of 1988 (NELS 88, also used in the present analysis), Aksoy and Link (2000) 
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estimate the effects of effort in secondary school students (surveyed in 8th, 10th, and 12th 
grades, with each time-student observation pooled together) on academic achievement 
test scores, employing a combination of random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) 
estimators, depending on which subgroups of race and data availability patterns3 passed 
the standard Hausman test of error orthogonality to predictor variables.4  Stratifying the 
analysis by these groups, the authors find strong, positive effects of student study hours 
across time points, accounting for fixed individual characteristics.  To its advantage, this 
paper’s authors diligently attempt to account for unobserved heterogeneity, and employ a 
large nationally representative survey to obtain estimates with a high degree of external 
validity.  Additionally, they model standardized, uniformly-graded achievement test 
scores as the outcome, thereby dodging my subjective evaluation criticism of GPA 
metrics. 
 Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007) focus solely on correcting for unobserved 
heterogeneity in identifying the causal effect of study time.  In their analysis of a small 
sample of students at Berea College (a small, nonselective university in eastern Kentucky 
intended to serve promising, underprivileged students), they employ Instrumental 
Variable (IV) regression analysis to obtain unbiased (if inefficient) estimates of the 
rewards to study effort.  Taking advantage of random roommate assignment in the 
university dorms, they instrumentalize study hours using information on roommate 
ownership of a video game system.  Finding that those students randomly assigned such a 
                                                 
3
 In this dataset not all individuals participated in all waves of data collection.  The authors restrict the 
analysis to individuals who participated in at least two of the three waves of the survey, and present 
separate models for whites and nonwhites who participated in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd waves, merely the 1st and 
2nd, and merely the 1st and 3rd. 
 
4
 Whites participating in all three waves, and those participating in only the first two, passed this test.  For 
information on the Hausman test, see Hausman (1978). 
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roommate do indeed study less for school and earn lower GPAs, they estimate a 
significantly positive effect for school effort on GPA.  Although these authors make no 
attempts to counter some of my criticisms of earlier literature in the field, their causal 
argument and attendant analysis is methodologically careful and substantively 
convincing. 
 These results permit the conclusion that once unobserved heterogeneity is 
methodologically accounted for, the effects of school effort on academic achievement 
over the short term are significantly positive and substantively moderate.  However, 
despite availability of data in several of these studies from multiple time points, none pay 
due attention to the role of achievement and effort processes over time.  Not only does 
such a substantive focus provide a different lens by which to view the causal role of effort 
in achievement, but it also asks a separate set of questions – Who learns more over time?  
From a given starting level of effort, what are the achievement rewards to changes 
therein?  How does effort’s role change over different times in the adolescent life course?  
These questions are more meaningful from a policy and individual-level perspective.  
Individuals will want to know the likely efficacy of increased effort inputs in their 
secondary schooling, given their present level of effort, environmental context, and 
personal history.  Those designing policy interventions come to a school filled with 
students working at a certain level, and need similar answers in order to determine the 
proper level of emphasis on hard work to impart. 
Two other literatures have particularly influenced this study, from which two 
specific papers require specific mention.  Literature on the general determinants of 
academic achievement suggests a perspective wherein such achievement involves two 
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dimensions – an individual’s unobserved capacity for achievement (which I discuss as 
‘achievement potential’), and the individual’s realized, observable level of achievement 
(here, simply ‘academic achievement’).  Guo (1998) finds that the relative timing of 
influences on achievement potential and academic achievement differs – that the former 
is largely fixed by the end of childhood, whereas the latter is amenable to influence well 
into adolescence.  I rely heavily on this perspective in the present analysis.  Finding that 
achievement potential is relatively stable by adolescence – the period of observation for 
my study – Guo’s analysis permits theorization concerning achievement trends and the 
role of effort in the realization of achievement levels commensurate with one’s top 
potential. 
 Theories of cumulative advantage have a venerable theoretical history in 
sociological and related attainment models, of which Diprete and Eirich (2006) provide 
an informative review.  The authors draw a distinction between two types of cumulative 
advantage processes – ‘strict’ processes more analogous to Merton’s (1973) classic sense 
in which future gains depend solely on current gains, and other processes more in the 
Blau-Duncan mold, referring to “persisting direct and interaction effects of a status 
variable, where the interaction effects [imply] group differences in the returns to 
socioeconomic resources” (273). 
 Drawing upon these perspectives, I conduct an additional line of investigation 
exploring the role of context structuring the effective limits of agency in a school setting.  
The primary analytical purpose of this paper is to investigate the average efficacy of 
changes in levels of schooling effort on gains in academic achievement.  I refer to the 
prediction that additional efforts will positively predict achievement gains the 
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“Bootstraps Hypothesis,” or BSH.  Yet it is also very likely that individuals vary in the 
rewards they reap for their efforts.  In particular two dimensions merit close investigation 
– family background and initial achievement levels. 
 Environmental contexts are well known to influence adolescents’ academic 
achievement.  Home, social, and area environmental characteristics differentially 
encourage adolescents’ intellectual growth directly (e.g., through norms concerning the 
importance of school and efforts of authority figures to ensure that children are diligent in 
their studies) and indirectly (via, for instance, the child’s nutritional and built 
environments).  It is possible that those in relatively environmentally deprived social 
positions will benefit more positively from additional effort in schooling than those in 
relatively advantaged social positions.  The assumption behind this perspective is that 
those in relatively disadvantaged positions have been disfavored by shortcomings in their 
environmental determinants of academic achievement.  If some portion of the 
performance influences of these environmental shortcomings can be compensated for by 
additional effort in their academic pursuits, environmentally disadvantaged adolescents’ 
efforts should yield higher returns than those from more advantaged backgrounds.  In 
short, this would mean that individuals can effectively use personal behavioral inputs as 
substitutes for environmental inputs into their learning process.  I will refer to this 
prediction as “Environmental Compensation Hypothesis” (ECH).  However, a 
counterargument can be made that individuals in relatively advantaged social positions 
are likely to benefit more from additional effort in schooling, since their environmental 
advantages may have better prepared them to work effectively and efficiently in school.  I 
label this the “Cumulative Advantage Hypothesis I” (CAH1). 
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 Prior academic achievement predicts future achievement levels.  But beyond this, 
prior achievement levels could potentially impact the efficacy of effort levels in the 
future.  If those at the top end of the upstream academic achievement distribution have 
achieved at levels commensurate with their latent potential and those at the lower end 
disproportionately have not, and if effort does indeed matter for academic achievement, 
we would expect that those at the lower end would differentially, positively benefit from 
effort relative to those at the higher end as compensation for these previous shortcomings 
in performance.  I refer to this prediction as “Latent Potential Hypothesis” (LPH).  
However, if those at the top end of this distribution have not achieved commensurate 
with their full potential, it may be that these individuals will benefit more from their 
schooling efforts than those at the lower end as a result of their greater mastery of prior 
materials.  I label this the “Cumulative Advantage Hypothesis II” (CAH2).5 
 Armed with these perspectives on the possible role of effort in educational 
achievement, in the next section I turn to the data and methods I employ in the present 
investigation.  Next, I reformulate the above hypotheses with specific reference to the 
data at hand, then present and discuss the empirical findings.  In the final section I 
summarize my findings and suggest further work in the more general line of inquiry 
proposed at the outset of the paper.  An appendix at the end provides additional results 
and methodological discussions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 To clarify, in Diprete and Eirich’s (2006) typology my cumulative advantage hypotheses, CAH1 and 2, 
correspond to the second, “Blau-Duncan” type. 
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Data and Methods 
National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988-1994 (NELS 88) 
 The NELS 88 public use dataset offers several advantages6 for studying the topic 
at hand.  It provides a large (N=27,394 cases), nationally representative data set of the 
cohort of U.S. adolescents in the 8th grade in 1988, and follows a subset (N=15,437) of 
them longitudinally through four waves of data collection, including data from ages 14 to 
about 20.  The sample is clustered by school, and the data includes rich information on 
family, school, teacher, and regional contexts, enabling in-depth contextual analysis.  
Lastly, the data includes detailed transcript information and, importantly, administrations 
of an identical set of subject-specific academic achievement tests in 8th, 10th, and 12th 
grades.  I restrict my analysis to those who participated in the first three waves of data, 
whose school was marked with an identifier, and who remained in school through 12th 
grade and completed all three achievement test administrations, leaving 11,727 cases in 
the analytical sample, clustered in 1220 schools for an average of 9.61 students per 
school.  
 Like all large scale surveys, the NELS 88 dataset suffers from a degree (here, 
generally very low) of missing data.  Table A1 in the Appendix details the proportion 
missing in each variable used in this analysis for the analytical sample.  Since data are 
unlikely to be missing completely at random (MCAR in Rubin’s (1987) parlance), some 
action is required to ensure that parameter estimates are unbiased in the statistical models 
                                                 
6
  Unfortunately for present purposes the NELS data also has some shortcomings.  Namely, not all 
environmental and behavioral variables of interest are measured at all time points in secondary school, 
rendering analysis of time-variant characteristics problematic.  Furthermore for those variables available at 
all three time points, the categorical coding schemes for inherently continuous variables frequently shifts 
between survey administrations.  Therefore several variables in this analysis have had to be recoded to the 
scheme with the least specificity so that variables are comparable between time points. 
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to follow.  Accordingly, I multiply impute7 the missing data using Stata’s ice function (a 
variant of classic multiple imputation procedures), creating five separate complete 
datasets on which all model parameters are estimated individually and then averaged 
using Stata’s micombine command.  In order to obtain unbiased estimates multiple 
imputation procedures formally require that either a completely random (MCAR) subset 
of variables are unobserved, or else that the missing patterns are random conditional on 
values of observed independent variables (“missing at random,” or MAR). 
Variables 
 The two primary concepts of interest in this study are schooling effort and 
academic achievement.  In this paper I restrict my analysis to mathematics achievement.  
I measure school effort using student categorical reports of the number of hours the 
respondent typically expends studying math outside of class in each week.8  While 
possessing the desirable properties of measuring effort-linked, specific, individual action 
in schooling and providing a metric highly comparable to the literature discussed above, 
this is an imperfect measure of school effort likely to be conflated with a number of other 
spurious factors.  Specifically, I posit that the variance in this measure may be 
apportioned between true effort, individual fixed properties (such as ability and work 
                                                 
7
 See Rubin (1987) and Allison (2001) for statistical details on multiple imputation.  For computational 
details on the ice and micombine commands in Stata, see Royston (2004). 
 
8
 The question reads, “In the following subjects, about how much time do you spend 
on homework EACH WEEK?”  Response categories for the first wave of data were “none,” “less than 1 
hour,” “1 hour,” “2 hours,” “3 hours,” “4-6 hours,” “7-9 hours,” and “10 or more.” In subsequent waves the 
scales of the categories shifted upward, so to make measures comparable between waves I replaced each 
category with the number of hours if it is a specific value listed, the median if a range is listed, and the 
lowest value in the highest category (i.e., in the first wave, 10). 
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disposition), class-level factors (most importantly, course difficulty), school level factors 
(such as the school’s overall academic emphasis),9 and random measurement error.10 
I measure academic achievement using a mathematics achievement test 
administered to students by NELS 88 in the 8th, 10th, and 12th grades, employing the item 
response theory (IRT) estimated number right metric.  NELS 88 staff recommend this 
metric for longitudinal analysis (Rock et al. 1991) as it is a reliable measure (thus 
somewhat reducing the problem of regression to the mean due to the overrepresentation 
of extreme random component values in the tails of the distribution) and, unlike 
distributionally-based scores, is directly comparable across administrations.  
Furthermore, this computer-administered test uses student performance on early 
questions to scale the difficulty level of subsequent questions, increasing precision of 
measurement in the tails of the true distribution and obviating the possibility of deceptive 
ceiling or floor effects. 
 I employ a number of control variables which I here describe briefly.  I measure 
course difficulty through two measures.  First, I use categorical math teacher reports of 
the achievement level required in the student’s class versus typical classes in the school – 
either higher, lower, or average.  Second, I include transcript information on the number 
of math courses completed by the student between 8th and 10th grade, 10th and 12th, and 
for the whole period combined. 
                                                 
9
 To identify the effect of effort per se I intend to deal with the conflation of homework hours with class- 
and school-level properties through the use of control variables and group clustering-robust estimation 
practices respectively.  As for conflation of the measure with individual fixed factors, these will be omitted 
from the parameter estimates through the use of a time-differenced fixed effects model, described below. 
 
10
 As a categorical metric of a fundamentally continuous property, measurement error in my study effort 
variable is potentially problematic.  Failure to deal with measurement error in this and other variables is a 
shortcoming of the present analysis and an arena for future work on this paper. 
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 I additionally control for psychological characteristics which are time-variant in 
this dataset and may impact individually perceived effort-reward connections.  NELS 
provides two such indices, measured in 8th, 10th, and 12th grades – an index of the 
individual’s “locus of control” (basically, the adolescent’s sense of efficacy in their 
actions and ability to shape their present and future), and an index of their self-concepts 
(containing measures of the student’s valuation of self).  Higher values for each of these 
indices indicate higher senses of control over their lives and more positive valuations of 
self, respectively. 
 Lastly, for some analyses I employ a standard index of socioeconomic status 
(SES) constructed by NELS 88 based on parental education, parental occupation, and 
parental income, and divide this measure into quartiles.  Similarly, for some analyses I 
divide an individual’s place in the 8th grade distribution of math scores into quartiles 
within the analytical sample. 
Model 
 In order to simultaneously account for individual fixed factors and examine over-
time determinants of academic achievement gains, I employ a first differences regression 
model in my analyses.  This model is derived mathematically in the Appendix.  The idea 
is similar to a fixed effects model in which variable values are differenced from the 
within-individual mean in order to wash out individual fixed properties from the model.  
In the first differences model, by contrast, variable values from one time point are 
subtracted from the next time point, leaving only change variables in the model and 
eliminating the conflation of predictor variables with stable, individual level factors.  The 
parameter estimates from this first differences mod
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test statistics are valid if differenced error terms are serially uncorrelated and of constant 
variance (Halaby 2004).  However, two methodological problems remain to threaten 
meaningful inference in this model.  First, if class-level factors exert time-variant effects 
through the measure of study effort and are not controlled for, regression estimates 
obtained from this model may be misleading.  Accordingly in my model I include 
controls for course difficulty and the number of math courses over time, which should 
refine estimation of the true effects of school effort. 
A larger problem arises from the possibility of time-variant individual-level 
factors in the error term which would cause serially correlated error terms and result in 
biased parameter estimates.  A similar threat is pointed out in the Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner paper with reference to study-GPA relationships, wherein effort decisions 
may respond to intervening grades throughout the semester, violating the assumptions of 
the model.  Concerning the first problem, Guo’s finding that achievement potential is 
fixed relatively early in childhood lends theoretical and empirical credence to the 
assumption that the effects of individual conflators such as achievement potential are 
time-invariant by the period of observation.  In response to Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner’s objections to fixed effects estimation (p 24) in investigations of effort-
achievement relationships, I argue that the feedback mechanism they so fear is far less 
likely to apply to inconsequential academic achievement tests in an anonymous dataset 
than for grades received in coursework, and is therefore far less of a concern for my 
purposes than theirs. 
 When estimating this model in the present analysis I center all non-categorical 
variables (locus of control, self-concept, math courses) excepting differenced values of 
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math achievement and study effort.11  I operationalize the categorical indicator of class 
difficulty as a series of dummies indicating upward and downward shifts in difficulty 
(e.g., higher than average difficulty to average or below average difficulty would 
constitute a downward shift) and omit the constant difficulty dummy variable.  I 
operationalize the variables in this way so that the constant term in the regression 
equation is readily interpretable as the mean gain in math test scores for the analytical 
sample for someone with average stable unobservable characteristics,12 sense of control, 
self-concept, and number of math courses taken in the intervening period whose course 
difficulty level was constant between measurements.  This model specification also 
permits similar interpretations of point estimates for the returns to changes in school 
effort at all levels of the distribution – e.g., the sum of the intercept term with 
[β1*(∆X*1it,t-1 = 15)] is equivalently interpretable for someone with a weekly increase of 
15 additional study hours for math with the same average or constant characteristics. 
 Finally, this model imparts some analytical advantages over the models estimated 
in similar studies discussed above.  First, like the Aksoy and Link (2000) article, it takes 
advantage of NELS 88’s panel design to account for unobserved stable characteristics13.  
Second, unlike Aksoy and Link or any of the papers discussed, it permits explicit focus 
on processes of change over time, a more suitable design for those with an eye toward 
self-improvement or institutional intervention. 
                                                 
11
 I do not center these two variables because their effects are more interpretable in their present form – in 
fact, I difference the other variables to encourage this interpretability. 
 
12
 Here I rely on Ken Bollen’s comment in my master’s defense that fixed unobservable factors are 
represented in the intercept of this first differences model.  I have not found any literature that makes this 
explicit point. 
 
13
 Note, that although both our designs may be thought of as fixed effects models, the FE and first 
differences models are not equivalent.  See Halaby (2004) p 522. 
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Analysis 
 Before proceeding to my results, I restate and expound upon the hypotheses of 
interest in this paper with reference to the NELS 88 dataset and their explicit tests: 
1. The Bootstraps Hypothesis (BSH): As discussed in the introduction, BSH predicts 
that individual effort will play a major, positive role in academic achievement, 
with the rewards thereof sufficient to make a difference in students’ prospective 
life chances.  Therefore, the test of this theory is twofold: a) If analyses reveal a 
main, positive effect of effort levels in schooling on academic achievement 
trajectories, the theory receives support; b) If any estimates of the impact of 
higher levels of effort on academic achievement are of sufficient magnitude to 
substantially impact students’ life chances, this result also lends credence to this 
perspective. 
2. ECH vs. CAH1: The Environmental Compensation Hypothesis predicts that those 
in relatively disadvantaged structural positions will benefit more from the effects 
of changes in school effort than those in relatively advantaged positions in terms 
of academic achievement gains.  The test of this theory is whether statistical 
interaction effects between indicators of effort and indicators of structural 
disadvantage predict differentially high rewards to effort for these populations.  
Oppositionally, Cumulative Advantage Hypothesis I  predicts that those in 
relatively advantaged structural positions will benefit more from their schooling 
efforts than do those in relatively disadvantaged.  The test of this theory is 
whether the same interaction effects used to test ECH are significantly negative. 
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3. LPH vs. CAH2: The Latent Potential Hypothesis, similar to the ECH, predicts 
that differential achievement returns to effort in secondary school, structured by 
upstream academic achievement.  Specifically, it postulates that those in the 
middle and lower ranges of the upstream academic achievement distribution (i.e., 
scores measured in the 8th grade) will benefit more from increases in effort levels 
since many of those in this range have likely not achieved in the past at levels 
commensurate with their achievement potential, at rates higher than those 
applicable to those in the top ranges of the upstream distribution.  Of course, some 
of those in this range will show scores in line with what one would expect from 
their latent potentials, but it is unlikely that these persons will lose ground as a 
result of increases in effort.  Unfortunately, since latent achievement potential is 
just that – latent – there is no way to test this hypothesis directly, but it receives 
some support if interactions between indicator variables for lower-range scores 
(or just the continuous format score) of the 8th grade achievement tests and effort 
levels exert positive effects on academic achievement, net of controls.  And once 
again, the follow up test is whether these gains are, based on previous estimates, 
sufficient to have much impact on students’ prospective life chances.  In contrast, 
Cumulative Advantage Hypothesis II predicts the opposite effect for the same 
interaction terms in regression analysis. 
ECH, LPH, and CAH1, 2 each predict interactive effects between school effort and 
quartiles of individual characteristics.  These two sets of mutually exclusive predictions 
differ on one characteristic only – the direction of any interactive effect.  However, 
within and without each of these predictions, interactive returns to school effort may 
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demonstrate additional characteristics of substantive interest.  All hypotheses and 
potential subcharacteristics are summarized in Table 1 for reference purposes. 
For the LPH and ECH predictions, several possible interactive characteristics may 
be of additional interest: positive convergence, in which the returns to maximum school 
effort are highly comparable between groups when they were not at lower values of 
change in effort; reverse cumulative advantage, in which lower quartile groups begin 
with higher returns to effort and increase their advantage with each incremental positive 
change in effort; and crossover, in which lower quartile groups gain lower returns to 
effort at the left end of the change in study efforts distribution, but reap higher returns 
than higher quartile groups at maximum change in effort.  In the case of crossover, an 
additional property of interest is the point at which the returns to effort for the lower 
quartile group eclipse those of higher quartile groups. 
Similar properties may be interesting for CAH1 and 2: negative convergence, 
wherein returns to changes in effort are equivalent between groups at the lower end of the 
distribution but substantially different at the higher end; crossover, in which higher 
quartile groups gain lower returns from effort at highly negative change in study efforts 
but reap higher returns at highly positive change in study effort; and cumulative 
advantage of a nonconvergent sort, in which gaps in returns to changes in school effort 
substantially favor the higher quartile groups at all points in the distribution. 
 
 
 
Evidence 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for my analytical dataset.  A few features 
thereof merit special attention.  First, mean math achievement shows wide variability and 
a clear upward trajectory between 8th and 12th grades.  However, this generally upward 
trajectory itself displays high variability, with a 95% confidence interval of [-3.29,27.40] 
– more than half the range covered, for instance, in the 12th grade cross-sectional scores.  
Second, mean reported homework hours start low and remain so, demonstrating no clear 
trend between 8th and 12th grades, but show a reasonable degree of variability cross-
sectionally and over time.  This last property is particular desirable for the present 
analysis, as a reasonably high degree of within-individual variability in measures is 
required to properly estimate my first differences model. 
Main Effects Regression Analysis 
 Table 3 presents the results of my main, noninteractive first differences model for 
10th-8th, 12th-10th, and 12th-8th differenced data.  All regression models presented employ 
one-tailed tests for the effects of study effort, and two-tailed tests for all other regression 
parameters.  In each of these models, change in school effort scores positively, 
significantly, and substantially predict gains in achievement test scores.  The effect of 
school effort is fairly equivalent between time ranges and roughly cumulatively additive 
(i.e., .17+.147 ~= .321). 
 The effects of other regression effects are also noteworthy, as all are included 
because they are related to, but conceptually different from, individual school effort.  
Taking harder courses, net of fixed individual factors, positively predicts achievement 
gains over the whole time range, although the true effect here is difficult to interpret since 
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it marginally significantly predicts achievement differences both negatively and 
positively in 8th-10th and 10th-12th comparisons respectively.  In contrast, the only 
statistically significant effect for taking less difficult courses applies over the entire time 
range, and runs in the expected (negative) direction.  Lastly, the number of math courses 
taken in the 10th-12th and 8th-12th intervals positively, significantly predict achievement 
gains.  Thus a number of other indicators that, although here analytically distinct, could 
be interpreted as effort measures also predict achievement changes, generally in the 
expected (positive) direction.  Lastly, changes in locus of control indicators positively, 
but marginally significantly, predict achievement gains as well. 
 It is difficult to overstate how rigorous the controls in the first differences models 
are.  Conditional on the assumptions discussed above, all individual time-invariant 
characteristics are irrelevant to the parameter estimates obtained.  These include all of 
sociology’s star stratification variables – family background, race, gender, as well as 
preadolescent life and school experiences.  That school effort exerts a positive effect in 
this specification shows that its effect is robust, indeed.  Therefore the Bootstraps 
Hypothesis receives very strong support from these findings.  Individuals apparently can 
on average, given where they begin, expect to increase their learning through the 
application of additional work in their schooling starting from any point in secondary 
school. 
 In order to yield a better idea of the size of these effects, Table 4 displays point 
estimated achievement gains in each time range at three different values of change in 
school effort – the minimum, constant, and maximum change values.  As can be seen, in 
between 8th and 12th grades an individual who puts in the maximum measu
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effort can expect to learn twice as much additional material as one who drops from the 
maximum effort value to no study effort over this time (16.05 – 8.025 = 8.025).  The 8th-
10th and 10th-12th comparisons show similar point estimates of the maximum/minimum 
change in effort gap.  At constant study effort levels, students gained 7.514, 4.246, and 
11.235 estimated correct answers for 8th-10th, 10th-12th, and 8th-12th respectively.  
Although these calculations are somewhat marred by the limitations of the study effort 
variable (since due to topcoding in this dataset two individuals could not measurably start 
at the same level of initial effort and then diverge in these ways), this analysis suggests a 
large role for study effort in determining over time achievement gains in this sample. 
 However, this model does not explain a great deal of the variance – only 10% in 
the 8th-12th model, and substantially less in the other models.  So while changes in effort 
on average increase achievement gains, there are evidently a number of other factors at 
work here not captured by my model. 
Interactive Effects Regression Analysis 
 In order to test whether the effect of study efforts on academic achievement gains 
varies between individuals of different family backgrounds and/or of different upstream 
achievement levels, Table 5 presents key results from interactive regression models 
stratified by quartile of these distributions.  (The full results are available in Tables A5 
and A6 in the Appendix.) 
Some brief explanation of these results is required.  In order to estimate group-
specific regressions for the first differences model, variable intercepts and regression 
coefficients were estimated in this model.  So the ‘Constant’ term represents the 
conditionally expected gain in achievement scores for sample members in the 4th 
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(highest) quartile of SES or upstream math achievement when all predictor variables 
equal 0.  Then the coefficients labeled [SES/Math]Q# represent the group-specific 
deviations from that intercept for members of each of the other quartiles of the 
distribution.  Similarly, the D(HW) coefficients represent the effect of change in study 
effort for members of the fourth quartile of each interactive distribution, and the 
D(HW)_[SES/Math]Q# terms present the deviation in group-specific coefficients for the 
indicated group.  So, to get the predicted partial regression line for the 4th quartile of SES 
in the sample, you would simply write D(Math) = Constant + D(HW) for the time 
interval in question.  In contrast, for the other quartiles, you sum the ‘Constant’ term with 
the [SES/Math]Q# term to get the group-specific intercept, and the D(HW) term with the 
D(HW)_[SES/Math] term to calculate the group-specific total effect.  These sums are 
provided in Table 6 for the SES interaction. 
 Do the returns to achievement returns to changes in effort vary by socioeconomic 
background?  In short: yes, somewhat.  The returns to constant effort levels vary 
substantially between SES quartiles – at this level each of the lower three quartiles on 
average learn significantly less than those in the highest quartile of SES, and each less 
than the group above them in a roughly linear fashion.  However, since these group-
specific intercepts include individually fixed unobserved characteristics, these estimates 
are not interpretable in terms of effort’s effects.  For that, we turn to the interactive 
coefficient estimates.  Those in the fourth SES quartile alone reap fully significant, 
positive achievement returns to changes in effort over all time periods, as seen in the 
main effect parameters.  In line with the predictions of the Environmental Compensation 
Hypothesis, all estimates of lower quartiles’ returns are either significantly positive, 
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indicating higher returns to their efforts, or nonsignificantly positive or slightly negative.  
Three of these coefficients are significantly, positively different from that estimated for 
those in SES Q4 – for SES Q2 and Q3 (marginally significant) in the 8th-10th difference 
model, and for SES Q1 in the 8th-12th difference model.  The total effects for these 
interactions are .204, .210, and .487 respectively.  Although these results provide some 
suggestive evidence that the returns to effort vary between SES quartiles, none of these 
interactive models indicate joint significance for the SES quartile interaction.  
Furthermore, statistical best practice, if not usual sociological practice, requires that we 
make adjustments to the p-values for these coefficients for multiple testing using, say, the 
Bonferroni step-down correction.  By this strict standard none of the interactive 
coefficients in any of the models pass muster as significant deviations from the main 
effect of study effort. 
 But given the appreciable size of some of these individual interactive coefficients, 
let us take their effects as real for didactic purposes.  The parameter estimates, when 
achieving any substantial level, run in the direction predicted by ECH.  Which of the 
other interactive properties – positive convergence, reverse cumulative advantage, and 
crossover – do these effects suggest?  Although I conduct no formal tests for these 
properties, the point estimates for each group at different levels of change in study effort 
presented in Table 6 are suggestive.  First, it is clear that reverse cumulative advantage 
does not apply here since group-specific returns to effort are all ordered by quartile at the 
minimum value of change in achievement.  Second, there is some evidence of positive 
convergence.  In each time frame the predicted achievement gains are more tightly 
clustered at the maximum increase in study effort than at constant or minimum change.  
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Third, a number of crossovers in returns are observed in these estimates, as detailed in the 
bottom half of Table 6.  Values in this portion of the table indicate the level of change in 
study effort at which their point estimated achievement returns intersect.  In the 8th-10th 
regression model, the predicted returns to change in study effort for SES Q4 are eclipsed 
by Q2 and Q3 at D(HW) = 5.64 and 5.88 respectively.  In the 10th-12th regression model, 
three crossovers in take place.  Listing the group whose returns eclipse those of the other 
first, these took place between SES Q1 and Q2 at D(HW)=-.37, between Q1 and Q3 at 
D(HW)=3.77, and between Q2 and Q3 at D(HW)=.76.  In the 8th-12th regression, SES Q1 
eclipses the predicted achievement gains for all three other quartiles, at D(HW) = 3.78, 
7.93, and 11.44 for Q2, Q3, and Q4 respectively. 
 So if these estimates are accurate, lower SES groups can expect higher 
achievement gains than higher SES groups in some cases, a finding weakly consistent 
with ECH.  However, as mentioned, these findings do not withstand more rigorous joint 
significance tests of multiple testing corrections for significance. 
 Returning to Table 5, the results for the test of interaction between study effort 
and upstream achievement can be briefly summarized: there is no interaction.  Main 
effects estimates remain significant and positive, but no interaction estimates achieve any 
respectable level of statistical significance. 
 Forgoing an investigation of the conditional point estimates for the upstream 
achievement interaction results, I present additional information on the substantive 
importance of the overall effects in Table 7 and possible interactions by SES quartile in 
Tables 6 and 7.  In Table 7 I convert the point estimates of the difference in expected 
achievement gains between the highest and lowest values for D(HW) for the overall 
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analytical sample and for each SES quartile into standard deviations of the change in 
math achievement over the appropriate interval.  Formally, 
Y^MAX-MIN =          (1) 
{E
 Qq[D(Math) |D(HW)=max] – E Qq [D(Math) |D(HW) =min]}/ σ QqD(Math) , 
where E
 Qq[D(Math) |D(HW)=max/min] is the expected value of D(Math) for quartile q 
given a maximum or minimum value of D(HW), and σ
 QqD(Math) represents the standard 
deviation of change in math achievement for quartile q over the interval in question.  
Thus this statistic may be interpreted as the standardized maximum observable difference 
between a student displaying a maximum increase in study effort between two periods 
versus the most negative value for this variable.  Again, due to the inability of any given 
individual to register both these values in this top-coded variable, these values are merely 
illustrative and should not be literally interpreted. 
 This metric, although artificial, indicates a substantial role for study effort in 
achievement gains over time.  The standardized effect is .66 for the 8th-10th regression, 
.80 for the 10th-12th regression, and 1.02 for the 8th-12th regression.  Thus by these 
estimates an individual in this sample could substantially increase her relative gains in 
math achievement overall time points with a maximum increase in effort compared to a 
maximum decrease in effort. 
 Furthermore, this table presents identical calculations for the effects of study 
effort by SES quartile.  The values in this portion of Table 7 range from .34 (SESQ4, 8th-
10th) to 1.55 (SESQ1, 8th-12th), with other estimates spread somewhat evenly in between.  
The average standardized value is .84 standard deviations.  These values indicate that 
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individual study efforts can make an appreciable difference in learning trajectories in all 
strata of socioeconomic status. 
 Lastly, part of the reason to study the effective limits of agency in secondary 
school is to attain an understanding of what proportion of inequality in achievement 
could hypothetically be eliminated through increases in study effort for disadvantaged 
students.  As another exploratory exercise, then, in Table 8 I calculate the percentage of 
the gap in initial achievement between quartiles 1-3 and quartile 4 of SES could 
hypothetically be eliminated by maximum increases in effort for students in SES Q1-3 
while SES Q4 students maintain constant levels of effort using 8th-12th interactive 
regression estimates.  Formally, these statistics are 
100*{[D(HW)=Max]*B1Qq} / {Avg(Math8Q4) – Avg(Math8Qq)} ,   (2) 
where B1Qq is the group-specific school effort coefficient for SES quartile q (i.e., the 
difference for that quartile in coefficient from Q4, not the total coefficient for that group), 
and Avg(Math8Qq) is the average 8th grade Math achievement for quartile q.  This statistic 
lends an indicator of what level of “catch up” could be expected as a result of a fifteen 
hour a week increase in study effort for SES Q1 through 3 while SES Q4 students 
maintain constant effort.  As can be seen, only members of Q1 could expect to nullify any 
significant portion of the initial achievement gap, 22.47%, using these estimates.  While a 
worthwhile effort, it appears that other aspects of student life would prove better 
candidates for intervention for those interested in closing the SES achievement gap this 
late in their schooling experiences. 
Discussion 
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 I begin this discussion with a review of the evidence for each of the key questions 
explored in this paper. 
 To begin, can students improve their academic achievement outcomes through 
increases in effort?  In short, yes.  The Bootstraps Hypothesis prediction for the effects of 
changes in study effort is strongly supported in this analysis.  The second criterion – is it 
enough to make a difference? – is also suggestively supported by the results in Table 7, 
although this standard requires additional investigation. 
 Can effort function as a substitute for omitted environmental inputs for relatively 
disadvantaged students?  These results are suggestive but inconclusive by the strictest 
statistical standards.  Still, these findings have been robust across a wide number of 
modeling strategies (not shown) attempted in the past to these data, so I suspect these 
effects are capturing a real process.  Future work on this subject should search for 
alternative metrics – school-quality indicators and more specific measures of home 
environmental quality are ready candidates – to capture the possible interactive effects of 
schooling efforts along these dimensions. 
 Are the effects of school effort structured by previous achievement levels?  
Apparently not.  This negative finding is highly counterintuitive.  One way or the other 
one would expect that mastery of materials would structure studying efficiency and 
resultant achievement gains, in a manner described by the Latent Potential or Cumulative 
Advantage II hypotheses.  How can we account for this negative finding?  The length of 
time between waves could supply one explanation.  If students mostly study to make the 
grade in high school rather than for long term mastery, this could obscure the true effects 
over such a long period of time.  Another could be rooted in the limitations of my school 
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effort measure.  Since categorical and topcoded at 10 and 15 hours a week, the full range 
of possible changes in effort between waves are not measurable – all the more so for 
those at the high end of the distribution.  Since study effort is positively correlated with 
initial achievement (see Table A2), this could obscure true interactive processes.  
Reanalysis using datasets with more fine tuned measures may help to resolve this issue. 
 Now, I turn back to the broader questions motivating this analysis.  First – Given 
the cards one is dealt in life, what can one do to improve one’s life prospects?  Something 
positive and consequential, according to this analysis.  If these main effects estimates are 
accurate – and their similarity to other, methodologically rigorous cross-sectional and 
panel designs discussed above suggest that they are – then on average the changes 
students make in their school efforts can make a real difference in their mathematics 
mastery.  To the degree that GPA and college admissions standardized tests capture this 
same mastery dimension, these effects are sufficient to substantially increase students’ 
prospects for postsecondary institution admission, and for admission to higher quality 
schools. 
 Second, what academic studies of human capital acquisition and its effects 
missing by treating years of education as proxies for acquired skills?  Quite a bit.  This 
analysis suggests that studies including indicators of effort and achievement in school, in 
addition to educational attainment, could provide useful undercurrents to the main effects 
of, and determinants of, educational achievement.  Future research should further explore 
these implications. 
 Last, is educational meritocracy plausible?  These findings are inconclusive.  The 
results from Table 8 suggest that some portion of the gap in achievement between SES 
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quartiles may be eliminated through hard work on the part of lower SES groups, but far 
from all.  These results are inconclusive, though, due to the likely association between 
SES and latent potential.  Simplistically, the degree of meritocracy in a system may be 
evaluated hypothetically by the relative contributions of ability, individual action, and 
social structure.  In this case all three elements are likely associated.  Strong positive 
results for effort in this study, which rigorously controls for the other two elements, 
would support a meritocratic characterization.  With these more middling results, though, 
the answer to the question remains inconclusive.  However, taking the long view an 
additional question would examine how family background structures the postsecondary 
(i.e., college admission, labor force attainment) rewards to effort in school.  I plan to 
explore this relationship in future work on this topic. 
 
Conclusion 
 These results indicate a strong role for effort in educational gains during 
secondary school in the United States.  They also provide suggestive, but limited, 
evidence that the achievement rewards are structured by family background.  Lastly, they 
disconfirm the intuition that the achievement rewards to school effort interact with 8th 
grade mathematics achievement levels. 
 Together these results suggest that individuals school efforts will be substantially 
rewarded, but to a restricted degree.  Furthermore they highlight the prospects for 
meritocracy in the US educational system – briefly, hard work can apparently lead to 
improvements in one’s situation, but is merely one of a number of to-be-determined 
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inputs that structure this process.  Finally, they imply substantial glossing of effect for 
studies that treat measures of years in school as measures of human capital. 
 Methodologically, future work in this vein should explore estimates using better 
indicators of school effort and different, more theoretically honed, measures of student 
environment to more rigorously test the precise main and interactive effects of changes in 
effort in school.  Furthermore latent trajectory modeling holds great promise as a 
methodological extension of the present work, since in so doing one may partial out fixed 
individual factors while characterizing whole trajectories (i.e., using all three 
measurement points) rather than the differences in the end point.  Doing so would also 
permit estimation of true effects net of measurement error in predictor variables, thereby 
overcoming a major shortcoming of the present analysis. 
 Substantively, the role of individual agency should be explored in other 
theoretically relevant arenas – other sorts of schooling besides secondary school and 
college, and labor force processes in particular.  Also, papers assessing the efficacy of 
interventions encouraging student study, particularly compared across environmental 
backgrounds, would be welcome additions to the literature. 
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APPENDIX 
 Several issues of substantive and methodological interest in this study require a 
bit of explication that did not fit into the main discussion framework of the paper.  In this 
appendix, I expound on the missing data procedure (Table A1); the relationships between 
study effort, mathematics achievement gains, SES, and upstream achievement (Table 
A2); the relationships between school effort and indicators of mathematics course 
difficulty (Table A3); and the relationships between mathematics achievement intercepts 
and slopes over time (Table A4).  Additionally I provide the full regression estimates for 
the interactive models by SES and initial mathematics achievement (Tables A5, A6). 
Missing Data Procedure 
 Table A1 part A provides the missing variable rates for variables of interest in the 
NELS 88 dataset with the sample restrictions discussed in the body of the text. 
 Generally the missing data proportions in the original dataset were very low.  The 
exception to this, as is immediately apparent in Table A1 Part A, is the teacher data, 
which includes teacher reports of expected class weekly homework (HW(T)), class 
achievement level compared to the rest of the school – low (LACHIEVE), middle or 
varying (MACHIEVE), and high (HACHIEVE).  Not all students participating in each 
wave of data collection also have linked teacher interviews, and not all of those with 
teacher interviews have math teacher interviews.  The sampling processes by which these 
two stages of sampling were conducted were completely random within the NELS 88 
sample.  Therefore, although the proportion missing is alarmingly high for these variables 
at first glance, these missing patterns are largely MCAR and amenable to imputation 
without undue concern.  (I could also drop these cases from the sample without worries 
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of bias, but I prefer to retain the larger sample size for statistical power reasons, which is 
an important consideration when breaking up the effect of the variable of interest into so 
many parts).  However, a few teachers slated for interviews did not end up participating 
or else skipped individual questions.  These missing values are unlikely to be MCAR, but 
are likely strongly structured by observed characteristics (e.g., school characteristics, 
average teacher quality, student characteristics) included in the imputation model.  In any 
case, the rates for this method of missing data for teacher-report questions are very low 
and unlikely to bias resultant estimates in such a large sample even if the missing patterns 
are not MAR. 
 Table A1 part b provides the case-level rate of missingness in the dataset.  Among 
the analytical sample, the median number of missing variables from all included in the 
imputation model (see next paragraph) was 8.  Despite the generally low rate of variable 
level missingness, only about 1/7 of this sample – 1,597 – would be included in the all 
analyses I conducted using listwise deletion, which would seriously threaten claims to 
results’ external validity.  Notably, these case-level missing rates are substantially lower 
when excluding the math teacher-reported variables. 
 To accommodate alternative estimation strategies involving time-invariant 
predictors, the following variables were used in the imputation procedure: math scores in 
8th, 10th, and 12th grade (Math#); study effort in all three waves (HW#); HW(T); 
respondent race; respondent gender; locus of control (LOCUS#) and self-concept 
(SELFCONC#) in all waves; LACHIEVE, MACHIEVE, and HACHIEVE; transcript 
reports of the number of math courses taken by 10th and 12th grade (UNITSMATH#,#); 
academic track; a variable measuring the frequency with which parents checked on their 
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children’s homework in the first two waves; an indicator of parental expectations for the 
student’s educational achievement; the socioeconomic status index; and indicator of 
parental educational attainment; a dummy variable indicating student limited English 
proficiency (LEP) in 8th grade; an indicator of the student’s home language environment 
(a dummy variable indicating non-English routinely spoken there); an indicator of 
parental structure (dummy variable for two biological parents living at home); student 
reports of the number of siblings living at home with them in 8th grade; a dummy variable 
for student immigrant status; dummies coding for census four-category region (Northeast, 
North Central, West, and South); and a three-category variable measuring urbanicity 
(urban, suburban, rural). 
 A few imputation specifications merit mention.  Ordered logit models were 
employed when the data were ordinal with six categories or less (parental educational 
attainment and number of siblings).  Multinomial logit models were specified for 
unordered categorical variables, and dummy variables with one omitted category were 
substituted for these variables when predicting other values (race/ethnicity, 
[L/M/H]ACHIEVE, academic program, and Census region).  Traditional logistic 
regression models predicted indicator variables (parental checks on homework, parental 
college expectations, LEP, home language environment, parental structure, and 
immigrant status).  OLS regressions were used for continuous variables (LOCUS, 
SELFCONC, and UNITSMATH) and ordered categorical variables with six categories or 
more (HW, HW(T)).  When predicting unordered categorical variables, imputed values 
were rounded to the nearest integer value. 
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 One last note: I realized when writing this paper that I made a potentially 
consequential mistake in coding this missing data procedure.  As mentioned in the main 
text of the report, I restricted the analytical sample to those in the longitudinal subsample 
(as coded by NELS) and those who had complete data on all three math achievement 
tests, although I included the math test scores in the prediction models for other variables 
with missing data.  However Allison (2001), argues that, while counterintuitive to some 
(including myself), it is essential to include all cases in the population of interest in the 
imputation sample, and in particular not to exclude cases based on the missingness in the 
outcome variable of regression analyses when, as is the case here, values are missing in 
both dependent and independent variables in the model (see Allison 2001 pp. 77-78). 
Who achieves?  Who puts in effort? 
 Table A2 compares the descriptive statistics of key variables (one-shot and 
change variables for mathematics homework hours per week and achievement test scores 
in all three waves and differenced scores) in extreme quartiles of the 8th grade 
socioeconomic status index and mathematics test distributions.  The first four columns 
show the means and standard deviations of these measures for each group; the fifth 
provides the difference in means.  I turn first to the SES comparisons.  SES Q4 students 
have higher mean hours of weekly study in all waves than SES Q1 students, and their 
distributions have higher variability.  Since this measure only assumes negative values in 
certain imputed values – a low percentage of the analytical sample – this indicates that 
high reports of homework hours are disproportionately populated by SES Q4 students 
compared to SES Q1.  Mean math achievement scores, predictably, are also appreciably 
higher in SES Q4 students than SES Q1 students.  Variability is slightly higher for SES 
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Q4 students than SES Q1 in 8th grade, but the standard deviations are equivalent in 
subsequent grades. 
 Change in these two key measures is also structured by SES quartile.  Increases in 
school effort are on average 3.3 times as high for SES Q4 students as SES Q1, although 
the value itself (.42) is not that substantial.  However, it should be noted that due to the 
survey design this measure is set equal to 0 for students not taking a math course in a 
given grade.  Hence much of this difference, particularly in difference measures 
involving 12th grade where many students do not take math courses.  In future work, I’m 
considering restricting the analysis to those students who take math courses in all three 
waves (since it is unlikely that students who don’t take 12th grade math study it in their 
free time anyhow) to see if this restriction affects effort returns estimates.14 
 The lower portion of Table A2 provides similar comparisons for extreme quartiles 
of the 8th grade math achievement test distribution.  As with the SES-based comparisons, 
Math8 Q4 students expend substantially more study effort in all three waves of data 
collection (by a margin of .92, .77, and 1.24 chronologically) – a higher difference than 
for the SES quartile comparison.  And, of course, mathematics achievement scores are 
much higher for the Math8 Q4 students than Q1 students. 
 Comparison of changes in these variables, though, reveal some noteworthy trends.  
Most notably, although they study less in 8th grade, Math8 Q1 students increase their 
study efforts more on average than Q4 students from 8th to 10th grade, an exception the 
                                                 
14
 Although in many cases failure to take a math course in a grade – particularly 12th, when doing so is 
frequently optional – may tap into the latent “school effort” construct, in other cases this may not be so.  
For instance, in high school I took no math courses in 12th grade, not because I did not wish to, but because 
there were no more math courses after Calculus I (which I took in 11th grade) available.  Furthermore, 
students on a semester-based “block” system in high school may eliminate math requirements earlier than 
others; although the number of courses taken is captured in my model, this still distorts ‘true’ effort 
measurements. 
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general trend of higher study effort indicators among the higher quartiles.  Similarly, 
Math8 Q1 students learn more on average between 10th and 12th grades than do Q4 
students, the lone exemption from the usual comparison.  Lastly, the mathematics gains 
variables for Math8 Q1 in all time ranges display greater variability than those for Q4, a 
pattern not found in the SES comparisons.  Although this is not necessarily meaningful, it 
suggests the possibility of a wider range of environmental or behavioral inputs in this 
stratum, further suggesting an interactive role for upstream achievement in examining 
achievement gains through time.  I intend to brainstorm the implication of this, combined 
with the null interactive regression findings for upstream achievement, in preparation for 
future work in this field. 
What does math homework hours per week really measure? 
 My interpretation of typical-weekly hours spent studying mathematics outside of 
class as an indicator of agency-rooted “study effort” is threatened theoretically, if not 
necessarily in practice, if it is primarily determined by classroom-level factors.  Although 
students sometimes have a choice of what level and number of math courses they take, it 
would be a theoretical stretch to interpret mandatory levels of effort in math class as an 
example of individual agency’s effects.  For this reason Table A3 presents time-
concurrent correlations between HW, HW(T), LACHIEVE, HACHIEVE, and 
UNITSMATH (not measured in 8th grade, hence that correlation’s omission. 
 Notably, all correlations run in the expected direction (positive for all but the 
dummy for LACHIEVE), and are statistically significant at the .05 level.  The strongest 
positive correlations are with HW(T) and HACHIEVE, particularly in 8th and 12th grades, 
but these correlations are actually weaker than I expected beforehand.  Modest negative 
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and paltry positive cross-sectional correlations are also observed for LACHIEVE and 
UNITSMATH. 
Which brings me to a point I have wished to discuss throughout this analysis but 
on which I have yet to gain full traction – the systematically aberrant processes in the 
10th-12th time range.  Here, all correlations are weakest observed among the three.  In the 
dataset, the change variables for HW and Math8 are at their nadir.  This time range 
uniformly observes the lowest regression coefficients for HW on D(Math) in the main 
effects first differences model, and, unlike the other time ranges, a complete absence of 
SES interactive effects at any level of significance.  The one exception to this trend is the 
comparable values for the “standardized maximum observable difference” analysis 
included in Table 7, where the values generally fall in between those for 8th-10th and 8th-
12th estimates.  In future work on this paper I intend to further explore these empirical 
regularities in order to ascertain whether these trends are likely to be true processes or 
spurious artifacts of data collection processes only. 
Intercept-slope relationships in Mathematics Achievement 
 The relationship between the Math8 and D(Math)8,12 constitutes a field of both 
substantive inquiry and methodological analysis in this paper.  The former because I 
interact the effect of HW on D(Math) with Math8 quartile variables, and the latter 
because of a concern that regression to the mean may threaten my analysis. 
 Table 5 demonstrates that, although overall Math8-D(Math) relationships are 
largely uncorrelated, relationships by stratifying quartile are consistent with regression to 
the mean.  Although this is less of a problem for my analysis than experimental models 
since spurious relationships are unlikely to be statistically channeled through HW effects, 
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in the interests of statistical best practices in future work I should explore corrections to 
this problem in the data.  A brief literature search suggests that for well-tested corrections 
for this problem are available in the statistical literature which I can employ to test the 
robustness of my results and to stave off reviewer criticisms when I eventually submit 
this article for journal publication. 
Model Derivation 
The properties of the first differences regression equation may be seen as follows.  I 
begin with the OLS regression equation 
Yit = β0 + β1X1it + ΣKk=2 BkXkit+εit ,        (A1) 
where Yit is academic achievement, X1it is study effort at time t, and K is the number of 
regression variables (with k=2 to K indexing controls).  If, as I suppose, individual-level 
and context-level properties play a role in the variance of  X1it and εit, then the actual 
regression equation assumes the form 
Yit = β0 + β1*(µX1i + µX1jt + µX1k + X*1it) + ΣKk=2 Bk*Xkit+(µεi + µεit + µεik + ε*it) , (A2) 
 where uX1i is an individual-level factor, uX1j is a time-specific class-level factor, uX1k is a 
time-invariant school-level factor, and X*1it represents true variation in effort combined 
with measurement error.  Concerning the expanded error term, uεi is a fixed individual-
level factor, uεit is a time-variant individual-level factor, and ε*it is the classical residual 
term.  I assume that school-level factors are entirely time-invariant and that class-level 
factors do not impact the error term independently from school factors. 
 Next, I take two such equations indexed to time t and t-1 and subtract the latter 
from the former, yielding 
∆Yit,t-1 = β0 + β1(∆µX1jt,t-1 + ∆X*1it,t-1) + ΣKk=2 Bk∆Xkit,t-1+ (∆µεit,t-1 + ∆ε*it,t-1) , (A3) 
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where ∆ indicates the value is time-differenced, and the error terms retain their same 
meaning, but apply to the differenced equation.  As can be seen, this operation excludes 
time-invariant individual characteristics from the study effort variable and residual, as 
well as fixed school-level factors from the study effort term.  Although I do not expand 
the control variable terms in this presentation, similar processes are likely to apply and 
serve to identify their true change effects. 
Interactive First Differences Regression Models – Full Results 
 Here I present the full results of the first differences interaction models from the 
main body of the paper.  I omitted these results from the paper proper for space 
considerations and because the controls’ effects were largely very consistent with those in 
the main effects model.  Accordingly I do not discuss them here; they are merely 
presented for completeness of information. 
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MAIN TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 – Summary of Main and Interactive Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Abbreviation Empirical Test 
 
 
 
Bootstraps 
Hypothesis BSH Positive main effect of D(HW) on D(Math) 
   
Environmental 
Compensation 
Hypothesis 
ECH Higher D(HW) effect on D(Math) for lower quartiles of SES 
   
Cumulative 
Advantage 
Hypothesis I 
CAH1 Higher D(HW) effect on D(Math) for higher quartiles of SES 
   
Latent Potential 
Hypothesis LPH Higher D(HW) effect on D(Math) for lower quartiles of Math8 
   
Cumulative 
Advantage 
Hypothesis II 
CAH2 Higher D(HW) effect on D(Math) for higher quartiles of Math8 
 
  
Interactive Effects Variants Empirical Test 
 
  
Crossover  E[D(Math)|D(HW)] is lower for Qx vs. Qy at one end of the D(HW) distribution, but higher for Qx vs. Qy at the other 
Convergence  E[D(Math)|D(HW)] is lower for Qx vs. Qy at one end of the D(HW) distribution, but similar for Qx and Qy at the other 
Cumulative 
Advantage  
E[D(Math)|D(HW)] is higher for Qx vs. Qy at all points; the gap 
increases with D(HW) 
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TABLE 2 – Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean SD Range 
Test Scores 
   
Math, 8th 37.58 12.07 16.38 - 66.81 
Math, 10th 45.19 13.71 16.37 - 71.53 
Math, 12th 49.55 14.39 17.32 - 78.1 
Effort & Math Classes 
   
HW, 8th 1.31 1.44 -2.97 - 10 
HW, 10th 1.74 2.30 -6.66 - 15 
HW, 12th 1.66 2.62 -10.14 - 15 
Test Trajectories 
   
D(Math)_8,10 7.67 6.44 -25.59 - 37.26 
D(Math)_10,12 4.38 5.51 -27.57 - 30.3 
D(Math)_8,12 12.06 7.83 -31.84 - 52.12 
Homework 
Trajectories    
D(HW)_8,10 0.41 2.47 -10.29 - 15.41 
D(HW)_10,12 -0.10 3.10 -18.45 - 15.66 
D(HW)_8,12 0.31 2.80 -13.43 - 15 
Change Course 
Difficulty    
Impd. Cls. Ach, 8-10? 0.16 0.36 0 - 1 
Impd. Cls. Ach, 10-
12? 0.30 0.46 0 - 1 
Impd. Cls. Ach, 8-12? 0.29 0.46 0 - 1 
Decd. Cls. Ach, 8-10? 0.16 0.37 0 - 1 
Decd. Cls. Ach, 10-
12? 0.11 0.32 0 - 1 
Decd. Cls. Ach, 8-12? 0.21 0.40 0 - 1 
Math Coursework 
   
HS Units Math, 8-10 0.00 1.22 -2.34 - 17.66 
HS Units Math, 10-12 0.00 2.76 -23.62 - 9.38 
HS Units Math, 8-12 0.88 2.55 -5.08 - 10.92 
Change Psychological 
Indices    
D(Locus)_8,10 0.00 0.64 -3.72 - 3.51 
D(Locus)_10,12 0.00 0.64 -3.66 - 3.32 
D(Locus)_8,12 0.00 0.70 -4.31 - 3.5 
D(Self-Conc)_8,10 0.00 0.66 -3.05 - 3.69 
D(Self-Conc)_10,12 0.00 0.65 -4.83 - 3.36 
D(Self-Conc)_8,12 0.00 0.74 -4.27 - 3.58 
 
   
Observations 11727   
Schools 1220   
Obs. Per School 9.61   
Min. Obs. Per School 1   
Max. Obs. Per School 43   
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TABLE 3 – First Differences Main Effects Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**: p<=.05 (one-sided) ++: p<=.05 (two-sided) 
*: p<=.10 (one-sided) +: p<=.10 (two-sided) 
 
TABLE 4 – Point Estimates from the Main Effects Model at Min., Constant, and 
Max. Levels of Changes in Study Effort 
 
8th-10th  10th-12th  8th-12th  
D(Math) 
Point Est. 
For D(HW) 
= 
D(Math) 
Point Est. 
For D(HW) 
= 
D(Math) 
Point Est. 
For D(HW) 
= 
5.814 -10 2.041 -15 8.025 -10 
7.514 0 4.246 0 11.235 0 
10.064 15 6.451 15 16.050 15 
 
Variable D(Math)_8,10 D(Math)_10,12 D(Math)_8,12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D(HW) 0.170 ** 0.147 ** 0.321 ** 
D(Locus) 0.226 * 0.174 * 0.159  
D(Self-Conc) 0.001  -0.038  0.114  
HS Units 
Math -0.032 
 0.259 ++ 0.672 ++ 
Impd. Cls. 
Ach -0.483 
* 0.496 * 1.065 ++ 
Decd. Cls. 
Ach -0.033 
 0.085  -0.867 ++ 
Constant 7.514 ++ 4.246 ++ 11.235 ++ 
Rsq 0.01  0.03  0.09  
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TABLE 5 – First Differences Interactive Effects Models, Select Results 
 
Variable 8th-10th 10th-12th 8th-12th 
Constant 8.664 ** 4.576 ** 12.391 ** 
SESQ1 -2.595 ** -0.503 ** -2.471 ** 
SESQ2 -1.660 ** -0.570 ** -1.723 ** 
SESQ3 -0.723 ** -0.303 ** -0.742 ** 
D(HW) 0.087 ** 0.144 ** 0.271 ** 
D(HW)_SESQ1 0.074  0.031  0.216 ** 
D(HW)_SESQ2 0.117 * 0.013  0.018  
D(HW)_SESQ3 0.123 * -0.022  -0.002  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Joint sig: Ints. **  **  **  
Joint sig: Coeffs       
Variable 8th-10th 10th-12th 8th-12th 
Constant 7.106 ** 3.524 ** 9.700 ** 
MathQ1 -0.850 ** 1.054 ** 1.129 ** 
MathQ2 1.034 ** 0.877 ** 2.585 ** 
MathQ3 1.507 ** 0.868 ** 2.682 ** 
D(HW) 0.139 ** 0.163 ** 0.279 ** 
D(HW)_MathQ1 -0.005  -0.058  0.097  
D(HW)_MathQ2 0.088  -0.034  0.009  
D(HW)_MathQ3 0.045  0.040  0.041  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Joint sig: Ints. **  **  **  
Joint sig: Coeffs       
 
**: p<=.05 (one-sided) 
*: p<=.10 (one-sided) 
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TABLE 6 – SES Interaction Point Estimates and Crossover Points 
 
D(HW)=min 8th-10th 10th-12th 8th-12th 
SESQ1 4.459 1.448 5.05 
SESQ2 4.964 1.651 7.778 
SESQ3 5.841 2.443 8.959 
SESQ4 7.794 2.416 9.681 
D(HW)=0 8th-10th 10th-12th 8th-12th 
SESQ1 6.069 4.073 9.92 
SESQ2 7.004 4.006 10.668 
SESQ3 7.941 4.273 11.649 
SESQ4 8.664 4.576 12.391 
D(HW)=max 8th-10th 10th-12th 8th-12th 
SESQ1 8.484 6.698 17.225 
SESQ2 10.064 6.361 15.003 
SESQ3 11.091 6.103 15.684 
SESQ4 9.969 6.736 16.456 
Crossovers (8-10) SESQ1 SESQ2 SESQ3 
SESQ2 none -- -- 
SESQ3 none none -- 
SESQ4 none 5.64 5.88 
Crossovers (10-12) Q1 Q2 Q3 
SESQ2 -0.37 -- -- 
SESQ3 3.77 0.76 -- 
SESQ4 none none none 
Crossovers (8-12) Q1 Q2 Q3 
SESQ2 3.78 -- -- 
SESQ3 7.93 none -- 
SESQ4 11.44 none none 
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TABLE 7 – Standardized Maximum Observable Differences: The Upper-Limit 
Effect of Changes in Study Effort, Standardized by Math Test Change 
 
Overall   
 
Min/Max(HW) 
Gap 
Max. Stand. 
Difference 
D(HW)_8,10 4.25 0.66 
D(HW)_10,12 4.41 0.80 
D(HW)_8,12 8.03 1.02 
 
  
SES Interactions  
D(HW)_8,10 
Min/Max(HW) 
Gap 
Max. Stand. 
Difference 
SES Q1 4.03 0.62 
SES Q2 5.10 0.79 
SES Q3 5.25 0.82 
SES Q4 2.18 0.34 
 
  
D(HW)_10,12 
Min/Max(HW) 
Gap 
Max. Stand. 
Difference 
SES Q1 5.25 0.95 
SES Q2 4.71 0.85 
SES Q3 3.66 0.66 
SES Q4 4.32 0.78 
 
  
D(HW)_8,12 
Min/Max(HW) 
Gap 
Max. Stand. 
Difference 
SES Q1 12.18 1.55 
SES Q2 7.23 0.92 
SES Q3 6.73 0.86 
SES Q4 6.78 0.87 
 
 
TABLE 8 – Percentage in the Math8 Gap between Each SES Q1-3 at Maximum 
D(HW) while Q4 D(HW)=0 
 
Group 
Max % Gap 
Negated by 
D(HW) 
SES Q1 22.47% 
SES Q2 2.70% 
SES Q3 -0.42% 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
TABLE A1, Part A – Variable-Level Missingness, Preimputation Data 
 
Variable 
Proportion 
Missing Variable 
Proportion 
Missing 
Test Scores  
SES Index, 8th 
Grade  
Math8 0.000 SES8 0.000 
Math10 0.000 Demographics  
Math12 0.000 Female? 0.000 
Effort & Math Classes  LEP? 0.026 
HW8 0.036 Immigrant? 0.057 
HW10 0.066 
Asian/Nat. 
Amer./Other 0.008 
HW12 0.064 Hispanic 0.008 
HW(T)8 0.522 African American 0.008 
HW(T)10 0.594 White-Non-Hispanic 0.008 
HW(T)12 0.632 Family Chars.  
UNITSMATH8,10 0.004 Pars. Chk. HW? 8th 0.003 
UNITSMATH8,12 0.000 Pars. Chk. HW? 10th 0.076 
LACHIEVE8 0.523 Par. Ed. < HS 0.005 
MACHIEVE8 0.523 Par. Ed. = HS 0.005 
HACHIEVE8 0.523 HS < Par. Ed. < BA 0.005 
LACHIEVE10 0.607 Par. Ed. = BA 0.005 
MACHIEVE10 0.607 Par. Ed. > BA 0.005 
HACHIEVE10 0.607 Non-English @ Home? 0.001 
LACHIEVE12 0.628 2 Bio. Pars. Not @ Home? 0.064 
MACHIEVE12 0.628 # Siblings 0.004 
HACHIEVE12 0.628 Psychological Indices  
School Track  LOCUS8 0.003 
HS Prog - Oth, Gen. 0.054 LOCUS10 0.018 
HS Prog - Academic 0.054 SELFCONC8 0.003 
HS Prog - Technical 0.054 SELFCONC10 0.019 
Geography  
  
Northeast 0.002 
  
Midwest 0.002 
  
South 0.002 
  
West 0.002 
  
Urban 0.000 
  
Suburban 0.000 
  
Rural 0.000 
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TABLE A1 Part B – Case-Level Missingness  
 
Number of 
Missing Values 
Case 
Frequency Percentage 
Cumul. 
Percentage 
 
   
0 1,597 5.83 5.83 
1 397 1.45 7.28 
2 163 0.6 7.87 
3 120 0.44 8.31 
4 1,519 5.55 13.86 
5 614 2.24 16.1 
6 243 0.89 16.99 
7 255 0.93 17.92 
8 1,289 4.71 22.62 
9 515 1.88 24.5 
10 243 0.89 25.39 
11 198 0.72 26.11 
12 2,713 9.9 36.02 
13 906 3.31 39.32 
14 373 1.36 40.68 
15 256 0.93 41.62 
16 179 0.65 42.27 
17 93 0.34 42.61 
18 57 0.21 42.82 
19 44 0.16 42.98 
20 29 0.11 43.09 
21 15 0.05 43.14 
22 6 0.02 43.16 
23 3 0.01 43.17 
24 5 0.02 43.19 
Sample-
restricted 15,562 56.81 100 
    
Total 27,394 100 100 
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TABLE A2 – Comparing Study Effort and Mathematics Achievement by SES and 
Math8 Extreme Quartiles 
 
SES      
Variable Q1 Mean Q1 SD Q4 Mean Q4 SD (Q4-Q1) 
HW8 1.00 1.20 1.64 1.65 0.63 
HW10 1.42 2.22 2.15 2.48 0.73 
HW12 1.18 2.48 2.23 2.83 1.05 
D(HW)8,10 0.42 2.37 0.52 2.66 0.10 
D(HW)10,12 -0.24 3.00 0.07 3.37 0.32 
D(HW)8,12 0.18 2.63 0.59 3.07 0.42 
Math8 30.40 9.20 44.82 11.57 14.42 
Math10 36.46 11.63 53.45 11.88 16.98 
Math12 40.33 12.39 58.36 12.32 18.04 
D(Math)8,10 6.06 6.46 8.62 6.20 2.56 
D(Math)10,12 3.86 5.45 4.92 5.41 1.05 
D(Math)8,12 9.92 7.71 13.54 7.55 3.62 
 
     
Math, 8th      
Variable Q1 Mean Q1 SD Q4 Mean Q4 SD (Q4-Q1) 
HW8 0.94 1.14 1.87 1.73 0.92 
HW10 1.40 2.27 2.17 2.38 0.77 
HW12 1.09 2.41 2.32 2.80 1.24 
D(HW)8,10 0.46 2.43 0.31 2.62 -0.16 
D(HW)10,12 -0.32 3.07 0.15 3.20 0.47 
D(HW)8,12 0.14 2.56 0.46 3.08 0.31 
Math8 23.18 2.71 54.31 5.15 31.13 
Math10 29.58 7.19 61.36 6.07 31.79 
Math12 33.97 8.68 65.56 7.26 31.59 
D(Math)8,10 6.40 6.33 7.06 5.49 0.66 
D(Math)10,12 4.39 5.22 4.20 4.88 -0.19 
D(Math)8,12 10.79 8.01 11.25 6.47 0.47 
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TABLE A3 – Correlations between Concurrent Study Effort and Class Difficulty 
 
 
HW(T) LACHIEVE HACHIEVE UNITSMATH 
HW8 0.1436 -0.0923 0.1822 -- 
HW10 0.0988 -0.0458 0.079 0.0529 
HW12 0.2218 -0.1285 0.2003 0.0855 
 
 
 
TABLE A4 – Correlations between Mathematics Achievement Intercept and Slope, 
Overall and by SES and Math8 Quartile 
 
Group D(Math)8,10 D(Math)10,12 D(Math)8,12 
OVERALL 0.0053 -0.0057 0.0003 
BY SES D(Math)8,10 D(Math)10,12 D(Math)8,12 
Q1 0.0748 0.0051 0.0663 
Q2 0.0523 -0.0081 0.0371 
Q3 -0.0693 -0.084 -0.1171 
Q4 -0.217 -0.0652 -0.2248 
BY MATH8 D(Math)8,10 D(Math)10,12 D(Math)8,12 
Q1 0.1278 -0.0185 0.0889 
Q2 0.0167 -0.0006 0.0136 
Q3 0.0595 -0.1072 -0.0277 
Q4 -0.3506 0.084 -0.2344 
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TABLE A5 – Full First Differences SES Interaction Model Results 
 
Variable 8th-10th  10th-12th  8th-12th  
Constant 8.664 ** 4.576 ** 12.391 ** 
SESQ1 -2.595 ** -0.503 ** -2.471 ** 
SESQ2 -1.660 ** -0.570 ** -1.723 ** 
SESQ3 -0.723 ** -0.303 ** -0.742 ** 
D(HW) 0.087 ** 0.144 ** 0.271 ** 
D(HW)_SESQ1 0.074  0.031  0.216 ** 
D(HW)_SESQ2 0.117 * 0.013  0.018  
D(HW)_SESQ3 0.123 * -0.022  -0.002  
D(Locus) 0.176 ++ 0.176 + 0.214 + 
D(Self-Conc) -0.045  -0.045  0.098  
D(Math Units) 0.246  0.246 ++ 0.598 ++ 
Impd. Cls. Ach? 0.485  0.485 + 1.100 ++ 
Decd. Cls. 
Ach? 0.066 
 
0.066 
 
-0.795 
++ 
Rsq 0.03  0.03  0.10  
 
**: p<=.05 (one-sided) ++: p<=.05 (two-sided) 
*: p<=.10 (one-sided) +: p<=.10 (two-sided) 
 
 
TABLE A6 – Full First Differences Math8 Interaction Model Results 
 
Variable 8th-10th  10th-12th  8th-12th  
Constant 7.106 ** 3.524 ** 9.700 ** 
MathQ1 -0.850 ** 1.054 ** 1.129 ** 
MathQ2 1.034 ** 0.877 ** 2.585 ** 
MathQ3 1.507 ** 0.868 ** 2.682 ** 
D(HW) 0.139 ** 0.163 ** 0.279 ** 
D(HW)_MathQ1 -0.005  -0.058  0.097  
D(HW)_MathQ2 0.088  -0.034  0.009  
D(HW)_MathQ4 0.045  0.040  0.041  
D(Locus) 0.268 ++ 0.178 + 0.146  
D(Self-Conc) 0.022  -0.040  0.118  
D(Math Units) -0.018  0.290 ++ 0.706 ++ 
Impd. Cls. Ach? -0.478  0.486 + 0.805 ++ 
Decd. Cls. Ach? -0.064  0.138  -1.070 ++ 
Rsq 0.03  0.04  0.11  
 
**: p<=.05 (one-sided) ++: p<=.05 (two-sided) 
*: p<=.10 (one-sided) +: p<=.10 (two-sided) 
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